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ABSTRACT. Natural resources management in general, and water resources management in particular,
are currently undergoing a major paradigm shift. Management practices have largely been developed and
implemented by experts using technical means based on designing systems that can be predicted and
controlled. In recent years, stakeholder involvement has gained increasing importance. Collaborative
governance is considered to be more appropriate for integrated and adaptive management regimes needed
to cope with the complexity of social-ecological systems. The paper presents a concept for social learning
and collaborative governance developed in the European project HarmoniCOP (Harmonizing
COllaborative Planning). The concept is rooted in the more interpretive strands of the social sciences
emphasizing the context dependence of knowledge. The role of frames and boundary management in
processes of learning at different levels and time scales is investigated. The foundation of social learning
as investigated in the HarmoniCOP project is multiparty collaboration processes that are perceived to be
the nuclei of learning processes. Such processes take place in networks or “communities of practice” and
are influenced by the governance structure in which they are embedded. Requirements for social learning
include institutional settings that guarantee some degree of stability and certainty without being rigid and
inflexible. Our analyses, which are based on conceptual considerations and empirical insights, suggest that
the development of such institutional settings involves continued processes of social learning. In these
processes, stakeholders at different scales are connected in flexible networks that allow them to develop
the capacity and trust they need to collaborate in a wide range of formal and informal relationships ranging
from formal legal structures and contracts to informal, voluntary agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
Natural resources management in general, and
water resources management in particular, are
currently undergoing a major paradigm shift
(Cortner and Moote 1993, Ward 1995, Gleick 2003,
Pahl-Wostl 2007a,b). Until recently, management
was often the exclusive task of technical experts
working under the auspices of the state. Their
activities were based on the assumption that water
and natural resources can be predicted and
controlled, notably by means of infrastructural
works. At the moment, however, participatory
management and stakeholder involvement are
becoming increasingly important (Global Development
Research Center 1992, Global Water Partnership
2000, Mostert 2003, Bouwen and Tailleu 2004,
Pahl-Wostl 2002a, 2007a). Moreover, awareness of
uncertainty and change is increasing. New
management practices that involve many
stakeholders must be adopted. A particular group of
experts or stakeholders can no longer learn on behalf
of all other stakeholders (cf. Pahl-Wostl 2007a).
Instead, “social learning” is needed. This paper will
present the social learning concept developed in the
European HarmoniCOP (Harmonizing Collaborative
Planning) project described in more detail below.
Collaboration
In recent years, the notion of government as the only
decision-making authority has been replaced by
multiscale, polycentric governance, which recognizes
that a large number of stakeholders in different
institutional settings contribute to the overall
management of a resource. This change reflects a
more general trend in public policy away from the
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hierarchical model, in which state authorities exert
sovereign control over the people and groups
making up civil society (Mayntz 1998). Instead, a
basically nonhierarchical mode of governing is
promoted in which different stakeholders, e.g.,
government bodies, companies, interest groups, and
individuals, collaborate in the formulation and
implementation of public policy (Rhodes 1997).
There are different motives for increasing
stakeholder involvement. One argument based on
democratic legitimacy emphasizes that all those
who are influenced by management decisions
should be given the opportunity to actively
participate in the decision-making process.
Principles of equity and social fairness demand that
the voices of the less powerful should also be heard
(e.g., REC 1998, 1999, Renn et al. 1995; C. Pahl-
Wostl and D. Ridder, unpublished manuscript). A
pragmatic approach is to build on the insight that
complex issues and integrated management
approaches cannot be tackled without taking into
account stakeholders’ information and perspectives
and without their collaboration. Interdependence
between government bodies and other stakeholders
is increasing because of, for instance, decreasing
government budgets that reduce the efficacy of the
traditional command-and-control management
style. Collective decisions are needed to implement
effective management strategies, and the
combination of top-down and bottom-up formation
of institutional arrangements may lead to a greater
acceptance by all the stakeholders involved.
This paper follows a pragmatic approach, albeit
recognizing that effectiveness and legitimacy are
related, and tries to provide evidence for the need
for social learning processes that can cope with
complex resource management problems. Social
learning is analyzed as a means of developing and
sustaining the capacity of different authorities,
experts, interest groups, and the general public to
manage their river basins effectively. This includes
the capacity to deal effectively with differences in
perspective, to solve conflicts, to make and
implement collective decisions, and to learn from
experience.
Uncertainty and change
Some insightful examples for the importance of
participatory governance come from the area of
adaptive management. Adaptive management first
focused on ecosystems but has increasingly
embraced the importance of the human dimension
(e.g., Berkes and Folke 1998, Lee 1999). Several
authors emphasize the need for a shift toward
adaptive co-management of social-ecological
systems in which cooperation among a wide range
of stakeholders and institutions is necessary. Hence,
adaptive co-management combines the dynamic
learning characteristic of adaptive management
with the linkage characteristic of cooperative
management (e.g., Berkes et al. 1998). Folke et al.
(2003, 2005) explored the dimensions and the nature
of governance that enable adaptive ecosystem-
based management and identified the four critical
factors for dealing with social-ecological dynamics
during periods of rapid change and reorganization:
 
1. Learning to live with change and uncertainty.
 
2. Combining different types of knowledge for
learning.
 
3. Creating opportunities for self-organization
toward social-ecological resilience.
 
4. Nurturing sources of resilience for renewal
and reorganization.
 They emphasize the role of networks, sense making,
leadership, diversity, and trust as well as the role of
organizations capable of accumulating the
experiences and collective memory they need to
cope with surprise and turbulence. Bridging
institutions play a major role in strengthening the
generation of social capital and creating new
opportunities and multilevel cooperation and
learning. The question arises of how these
characteristics are developed and sustained.
Factors such as climate change, the rapid dynamics
of socioeconomic development, and globalization
are increasing the amount of uncertainty faced by
managers from regional to global scales. This
requires a more adaptive and flexible management
approach that can speed up the learning cycle to
allow for more rapid assessment and implementation
of the consequences of new insights. This type of
adaptive manager needs new skills and capabilities,
informal and flexible management structures, and
access to expert knowledge as well as local lay
knowledge.
Folke et al. (2003) point out that social learning is
essential for building up the experience needed to
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cope with uncertainty and change. They emphasize
that “ ... knowledge generation in itself is not
sufficient for building adaptive capacity [...] to meet
the challenge of navigating nature’s dynamics ... ”
and conclude that “ ... learning how to sustain social-
ecological systems in a world of continuous change
needs an institutional and social context within
which to develop and act.” Such findings support
this paper’s concept of social learning and
knowledge as participation. Knowledge and the
ability to act upon new insights are continuously
questioned, applied, and regenerated or expressed
alternatively in social processes. The social network
of stakeholders is an invaluable asset for dealing
with change. A similar argument was made by
Tompkins and Adger (2004). They pointed out that
community-based management enhances adaptive
capacity in two ways: by building networks that are
important for coping with extreme events and by
retaining the resilience of the underpinning
resources and ecological systems. Social learning
increases adaptive capacity and leads to sustained
processes of attitudinal and behavioral change by
individuals in social environments through
interaction and deliberation.
This paper
This paper develops the social learning concept as
envisioned in the European project HarmoniCOP.
The main objectives of HarmoniCOP were to
increase the understanding of participatory river
basin management in Europe, to generate
practically useful information about and improve
the scientific base of social learning and the role of
information and communication technology (ICT)
tools in river basin management, and to support the
implementation of the European Water Framework
Directive. The first step was the development of a
conceptual approach for social learning and the role
of ICT tools. These concepts served as the basis of
a design for empirical studies in 10 case studies
across Europe. More information on the
HarmoniCOP project is available on their Web site
at www.harmonicop.info.
The current paper focuses on the conceptual
foundations of social learning. The next section
introduces social learning as a group process,
embedded in a structural governance context that
influences and is influenced by this process. The
subsequent sections focus on multiparty processes
and structural change. Details on the major insights
of the empirical results of the work are reported
elsewhere (Tippet et al. 2005, Mostert et al. 2007).
SOCIAL LEARNING CONCEPTS
Social learning has become quite a popular term in
the literature on natural resource management and
has been used to refer to all kinds of processes of
learning and change. As a consequence, its meaning
has become quite vague. Originally, social learning
referred to the learning of individuals in a social
environment by observation and imitation of others
(Bandura 1977). Because it focuses on the cognitive
processes of individuals, the original concept does
not consider group processes such as the
development of shared meanings and values that
provide a basis for joint action. As pointed out by
Röling (2002), it is necessary to move from
individual “multiple cognitions” to interrelated
“distributed cognition” and to an understanding of
group processes to capture the essence of social
learning. Learning concepts applied to whole social
entities can be found mainly in work on
organizational learning such as Argyris and Schön
(1978, 1996), Senge (1990), and Wenger (1998).
Such concepts emphasize the development of
shared meanings and practices that characterize the
social entity as a whole.
The HarmoniCOP (Harmonizing Collaborative
Planning) project developed a new conceptual
framework to capture the essential processes of
multilevel social learning in river basin
management. The focus is on the learning of the
social entity as a whole. The framework is
characterized by a broad understanding of social
learning that is rooted in the more interpretative
strands of the social sciences. The key message of
“learning together to manage together” also sheds
new light on the understanding of the management
process (Bouwen and Taillieu 2004, Pahl-Wostl
2002a, 2006, Craps 2003). The framework for this
type of learning is provided by multiparty
collaboration embedded in a specific context and
leading to specific outcomes. A feedback loop
between outcomes and context takes into account
structural changes in a cyclic and iterative fashion
(Fig. 1).
The context of social learning includes the
governance structure and the natural environment
in a river basin. The governance structure includes
the pertinent legal and organizational framework as
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework for social learning in resources management. In the center are multiparty
processes that are influenced by the context in which they are embedded and produce outcomes that may
lead to changes in the context and thus to a cyclic and iterative process of change.
well as the cultural and socioeconomic
environment. The governance structure has a strong
influence on the nature of multiparty cooperation
and social learning processes. Results from
empirical analyses show, for example, that
centralized political and economic systems,
privatization, commercialization of the environment,
rigid bureaucratic systems, and political secrecy and
poor public access to information can impede social
learning (Tippet et al. 2005, Mostert et al. 2007).
Environmental improvement may require a long-
term change in the governance structure that may
have to be brought about in a stepwise and
incremental manner.
Multiparty interactions in actor networks are
typically the core of formal or informal participatory
processes in resources management. One can
distinguish two major aspects: (1) the processing of
factual information about a problem and (2) solving
management problems, i.e., problem/task management,
and engagement in social exchange processes or
social-relational issues. Social relations are
inextricably linked to dealing with management
problems because managers must explicitly take
into account whose problems are solved and how
these problems are framed. The integration of social
and content issues is facilitated by relational
practices such as task-oriented actions with
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relational qualities of reciprocity and reflexivity
(Bouwen and Tallieu 2004). Relational practices
may take different forms, such as joint field visits
or common training sessions. The quality of the
interaction, the shared ownership of a task or
project, openness for mutual testing and
contradiction, and the opportunity for reflexive
moments are all important components of such a
practice.
Social involvement comprises essential elements of
social processes related to problem definition,
direction setting, and implementation, including
issues such as the framing of the problem, the
representation and management of boundaries, the
type of ground rules and negotiation strategies
chosen, and the role of leadership in the process.
This concept has as its central hypothesis that
content management and social involvement are
strongly interdependent and cannot be separated.
Similar to the dual nature of the processes, the
outcomes refer on the one hand to the
implementation of measures to deal with an
environmental problem but, on the other, to the
capacity of the stakeholder group to deal with
problems as well. It is assumed that high-quality
processes in this type of multiparty cooperation lead
to outcomes that are of a better technical quality, e.
g., highly effective and beneficial to the
environment, and enhance the relationships
involved by, e.g., increasing the capacity of a
stakeholder group to manage a problem and the
satisfaction of the participants with the overall
process. The contribution of the quality of the
process to the outcomes is in line with the overall
concept of procedural rationality, which states that
the preference regarding an outcome of a decision
depends on the nature and the quality of the process,
or how the decision was derived (Joss and Brownlea
1999, Pahl-Wostl 2002b). Active involvement and
the building of a sense of ownership of the overall
decision-making process among all participants
lead to a higher willingness to reach agreement and
to more commitment to the outcome.
The overall social learning process can be described
as a multiscale process. The foundation of social
learning as investigated in the HarmoniCOP project
are multiparty collaboration processes that are
perceived to be the nuclei of learning processes.
Such processes take place in networks or
“communities of practice” (Wenger 1998) and are
influenced by the governance structure in which
they are embedded.
Hence social learning is assumed to occur at two,
or even three, levels (Fig. 2):
 
l
 on short to medium time scales at the level of
processes between collaborating stakeholders
in collaboration processes (see below);
 
l
 on medium to long time scales at the level of
change in actor networks (possible outcome/
feedback of processes); and
 
l
 on long time scales at the level of change in
governance structure (formal and informal
institutions and cultural values, norms, and
paradigms).
These three levels correspond to three different
levels of agent interaction: micro, meso, and macro
(see below). The three levels are interdependent,
and multilevel change is assumed to proceed in an
iterative and not necessarily sequential fashion via
second-order feedback. An analogy may be drawn
with the concept of single- and double-loop learning
in organizational learning (Argyris and Schön 1978,
1996). Single-loop learning refers to an
instrumental change in strategy within the
constraints given by overall norms and beliefs.
Double-loop learning refers to more radical changes
in underlying values and beliefs.
It is assumed that long-term changes in governance
structure and underlying values and paradigms
cannot occur within a water management regime in
isolation from the societal context. A comprehensive
understanding of social learning must take these
multilevel processes on different time scales into
account. The next section explores in more detail
the learning processes at Level 1, which were the
main focus of the HarmoniCOP project, and the
interactions of Levels 1 and 2. The subsequent
section will analyze structural changes at Level 3
and its interactions with Level 2.
LEARNING IN MULTIPARTY PROCESSES
At the heart of the concept of social learning
developed here are multiparty processes in which
representatives from stakeholder groups interact on
a regular base. Such processes may be more or less
formalized. Olsson et al. (2006) and Gunderson
(1999) emphasized the role of shadow networks as
incubators for new approaches to governing social-
ecological systems. They argue that the emergence
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Fig. 2. Three-level representation of multiscale social learning processes: (1) Level 1 (micro): the
multiparty collaboration process in which representatives from different stakeholder groups interact. As
indicated, this level refers to the process level in the center of Fig. 1; (2) Level 2 (meso): the actors in
the water management regime consisting of more or less organized stakeholder groups, e.g., authorities,
associations, who may partly engage in bilateral interactions; and (3) Level 3 (macro): the governance
and societal structural conditions that are characterized by cultural values, governance regime, or power
structures. This level is identical to the conceptual framework illustrated in Fig. 1.
of shadow networks for adaptive governance is a
self-organizing process often triggered by a social
or ecological crisis. Nooteboom (2006) provided
evidence for the importance of adaptive networks
in sustainability transitions. Adaptive networks are
self-organizing groups of policy makers who enable
joint fact-finding and visualize how to achieve the
desired improvements.
To improve our understanding of such processes, it
is of interest to make use of the concept of
“communities of practice” developed by Wenger
(1998). Wenger originally developed his concepts
for business environments, but, in recent years,
these concepts have been used to analyze
interorganizational collaborations and emerging
social entities in general (Wenger 2000). Wenger
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emphasizes learning as participation in groups of
people who engage in a process of collective
learning in a shared domain of human endeavor.
Such participation is influenced by and may change
the social structure. At the same time, the individual
gains experience in the context of the group. Such
learning processes confirm and shape the identity
of the individual in his or her social surroundings.
They confirm and change social practice and the
associated interpretation of the environment. In
communities of practice (CoPs), it is important for
the collective endeavor to address a clear-cut issue.
This condition seems to be met in most cases of
multiparty collaborative processes in the context of
environmental management. CoPs continuously
redefine themselves by processes of participation,
e.g., membership, acting, and reification, which
includes forms, documents, and instruments. This
is an important element in the formation of groups,
i.e., membership must go beyond participation and
be linked to joint practice. CoPs develop an identity
of their own that is distinct from the individuals
participating in them. In this sense, the participating
actor groups can be understood as established CoPs,
but a multiactor platform in itself can become a new
or transitory CoP (see Appendix 1 for additional
details).
CoPs can be understood as social forms to manage
and generate knowledge. Because the results of
social learning processes are preserved in a CoP in
its shared roles and practices, they constitute social
capital that goes beyond individual knowledge and
skills. We use social capital here as defined by
Putnam (1995, 2000) to refer to features of social
organization such as networks, norms, and social
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for
mutual benefit. Thus, in economic terms, it can be
argued that, the higher the social capital in a given
social context, the lower the transaction costs
needed in the provision of a public good such as
environmental quality or improving ecosystem
resilience. In terms of the analytical approach, CoPs
can be understood as a new focus on diverse actor
networks in the way they manage and generate
knowledge. This is of particular interest in the
adaptive management of complex river basins in
which different sources of knowledge and a
continuous process of learning from experience and
new insights are, or rather should be, at the core of
management practices.
Such a broad understanding of social learning that
is rooted in the more interpretative strands of the
social sciences embraces different ways to
understand knowledge. The natural sciences and
engineering focus on knowledge as objective facts
that refer to the purely cognitive elements of
learning and largely neglect situated and
experiential knowledge even when the latter is also
of key importance in natural science and
engineering practice. It is tacit knowledge that
cannot be externalized but can contribute to
innovation (Nonaka and Taceuchi 1995). Each
individual develops his or her own tacit knowledge,
which can only be shared by common practice.
However, as pointed out by Hildreth and Kimble
(2002), trying to make a clear distinction and create
a dichotomy between tacit and explicit knowledge
may not be useful, because knowledge always
contains elements of both, albeit to a different
degree depending on knowledge type and context.
What has often been described as the “hard” and
“soft” dichotomy is resolved if the dialectic and dual
nature of knowledge is explicitly taken into account.
All knowledge is enacted in skills and attitudes that
result from shared experiences.
This leads as well to a different interpretation of the
role of information and the ability of an actor
network to use new information in social learning
processes and derive collective action from new
insights rooted in shared experiences. In particular,
informal learning environments in which actors are
more willing to leave entrenched positions are
perceived to be crucial for the adaptive governance
of social-ecological systems (Folke et al. 2005).
Hence, an entirely new element of monitoring
emphasizes the quality of the communication
process in actor networks and the appropriateness
of an implemented institutional setting for
processing information and managing knowledge
to achieve a certain task. Such understanding of
knowledge has implications for the role of
information and communication (IC) tools (Maurel
et al. 2007), which range from simple graphical
devices to GIS maps and integrated simulation
models. It may also facilitate relational practices.
Participatory modeling is an example in which
models and the whole process of model
development are embedded in a relational practice
that links reflexive moments and different kinds of
learning with model development and problem
management (Pahl-Wostl 2002a, Pahl-Wostl and
Hare 2004). Participatory modeling makes it
possible to integrate both tacit and explicit
knowledge and the combination of experiential and
cognitive elements of learning. Consequently, the
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role of IC tools lies in their potential to support social
learning processes rather than just their ability to
convey facts, elicit and formalize knowledge, and
predict the consequences of human action.
Based on this understanding of Level 1 processes
(cf. Fig. 2), it is possible to identify a suite of
complementary processes that are of key
importance in analyzing and understanding social
learning. In the initial phase of any multiparty
process, it is important to explicitly discuss and
establish the ground rules for interaction. To
increase the involvement and satisfaction of the
participants, agreement on the ground rules, e.g.,
who sets the agenda, how conflicting views are
managed, how decisions are made, etc., is an
important element. The agreement on ground rules
promotes joint ownership of a process and may
reveal in an early stage potential sources of
disagreement and conflict. Without explicit
agreement on rules, no reflexivity or change of rules
is possible (see Interaction ground rules in
Appendix 2).
Despite the collaborative nature of social learning
processes, strong leadership and facilitation have
proven to play a key role (Tippet 2005, Mostert et
al. 2007). However, leadership does not refer to
imposing a view on a group but to collaborative
leadership, which can mobilize energies, generate
trust, give vision, and support the collective finding
of a clear direction in a multiparty process (see
Leadership and facilitation in Appendix 2).
In particular, during the initial stages of dealing with
a problem situation, the processes involved in
framing and reframing a problem domain strongly
influence the direction of the overall process. Actors
hold frames that determine how they give sense and
meaning to information and their physical and social
environments. Frames may derive from, e.g.,
culture, social role, scientific disciplines, etc.
Differences in the framing of an issue are among
the key reasons for miscommunication and conflict.
The framing of an issue includes, for example, what
is at stake and who should be included and in which
role. As is also explained in Framing and reframing
the issues in the problem in Appendix 2, processes
of framing and reframing are essential elements of
the social dynamics of the group during processes
of negotiation of meaning.
The nature of the negotiation strategies chosen
determines to a large extent the roles that different
actors are willing to take and the degree of openness
of the process. Multiparty processes that are not too
tightly coupled to a formal decision-making and
implementation process leave more room for
creativity and innovation because the participants
may not start to negotiate from entrenched positions
(see Negotiation strategies in Appendix 2). The role
of leadership and facilitation is to generate the trust
needed to engage in an open debate and leave
entrenched positions.
Processes of social learning touch strongly on
individual and collective identities and issues of
ownership involving knowledge, processes, frames,
etc. As a result, representation and boundary
management between the in-group and the
multiparty group is a crucial element. Most
participants in multiparty processes act as
representatives of their constituencies. At the same
time, the overall group processes develop their own
boundaries, which determine who is in and who is
out and, related to that point, what is in and what is
out, e.g., geographical scope, issues covered, etc.
Consequently, as seen in Representation and
boundary management in Appendix 2, a crucial
element of social involvement is how the
individuals and the group manage the various
boundaries encountered in such processes.
All these processes act in concert and determine the
dynamic nature and the quality of multiparty
collaboration processes. Given their strong
interdependence, it is impossible to isolate the
influence of individual factors in empirical
investigations.
The nature of these processes is strongly influenced
by the governance structure and cultural context in
which group processes are embedded. The ground
rules chosen to govern interactions reflect the norms
and experiences of the actors. Negotiation strategies
are based on what is deemed to be acceptable and
successful in a group. It was found in the case studies
that rigid hierarchical and bureaucratic structures
stabilized the status quo and provided strong
barriers to social learning (Tippett 2005, Mostert et
al. 2007).
What is learned in these social processes of
multiparty interaction? Stakeholders define the
goals and the means to achieve them. Within these
groups, actors should learn to be able to deal with
different perspectives and define collective
strategies to solve a problem. It may be possible to
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distinguish different layers of learning. Stakeholders
may renegotiate strategies within prevailing
paradigms and value structures; this is mainly
learning at Level 1, within the multiparty process.
However, multiparty processes may form the nuclei
for changes in the context as indicated by the
feedback loop in Fig. 1 and represented in the
interaction between levels in Fig. 2. This may lead
to changes in the social construction of the overall
problem domain, in the value structures within
organizations, and finally in a water management
regime itself. Such change may also feed back to
and be influenced by the societal context in which
water management is embedded.
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND
CHANGE IN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Figure 2 portrays schematically the structural
governance context in which multiparty processes
are embedded. The network of collective actors
characterizing a water management regime (Level
2) constitute the direct level of interaction that is
itself embedded in the overall governance structure,
the societal context (Level 3). The perceived
inability to tackle the challenges involved in current
or future management problems may be a trigger
for change in the overall water governance structure.
However, a really fundamental change cannot be
limited to water governance alone, because water
management regimes are closely intertwined with
the overall societal context. As defined by the
Global Water Partnership dialogue on water
governance (Global Water Partnership 2002), water
governance refers to the range of political, social,
economic, and administrative systems that are in
place to regulate the development and management
of water resources and the provision of water
services at different levels of society. We adopt here
this broad approach to governance, which
encompasses all modes of political steering.
Correspondingly, many linkages may be identified
between Levels 2 and 3. Apart from formal
connections, e.g. regulatory structures, informal
influences such as the political culture of
participation can be expected to have an effect on
water governance. Indeed, empirical results from
the HarmoniCOP (Harmonizing Collaborative
Planning) studies revealed that the structural context
had a significant influence on participatory
processes (Mostert et al. 2007). We focus on two
kinds of kinds of interaction:
 
l
 the role of social learning in informal actor
platforms, which may act as a structural
element to increase the adaptive capacity of
water governance regimes, and
 
l
 the influence of the structural governance
context on the implementation of such actor
platforms, as well as the influence of the
emergence of such informal structures on the
governance context.
 The informality of actor platforms implies that rules
for membership or negotiation strategies are open
rather than prescribed by formal institutions.
Nevertheless, the lack of accountability and explicit
rules resulting from excessive informality may also
create situations of arbitrariness and make it hard to
change tacit power relationships and regimes.
We use the word “institutions” to refer to the formal
and informal rules governing the behavior of human
beings. Formal institutions include laws and
regulations such as the European Water Framework
Directive, formal organizational structures, and
formal procedures. Informal institutions can be
defined as socially shared rules, usually unwritten,
that are created, communicated, and enforced
outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke
and Levitsky 2004). They may refer to social norms
or rules of good practice in a practitioner’s
community. Formal and informal institutions may
or may not be effective, and the processes by which
compliance is achieved or even enforced differ
largely.
For social learning to increase both the adaptive
capacity and the effectiveness of water management
requires a fine balance between the stabilizing and
the change-supporting elements of a governance
regime. Regulatory frameworks and cultural values
provide long-term stability, whereas flexibility and
change are provided by learning and negotiation
processes in dynamic actor networks in which the
interpretation of rules may be substantially
renegotiated or rules may even be changed. A
certain degree of stability is needed for actors to
build their expectations regarding future developments
that influence their own decision making.
Processing information, negotiating, and changing
rules are resource-intensive activities that should be
limited to what is perceived by stakeholders
themselves and by the policy analyst, respectively,
to be necessary to cope with challenges arising for
the management of water resources from a fast-
Ecology and Society 12(2): 5
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art5/
changing socioeconomic and environmental
context.
Collaborative platforms may become de facto a
permanent part of the governance structure, play a
key role in cross-scale linkages at both geographic
and organizational scales, and improve horizontal
and vertical interplay in water governance regimes.
This does not imply that such platforms have to or
should be entirely formalized in terms of
membership, procedural rules, roles, and the
distribution of decision-making power. Formalization
may destroy the very characteristics of the open
platforms embedded in dynamic networks that
render them so valuable in adaptive governance.
Gray (1999) concluded from a comprehensive
synthesis of empirical research on multiparty
collaborations that the most resilient collaborative
networks show a balance between increasing
institutionalization and the formation of social
capital, i.e., the increase in the ability of
stakeholders to achieve collective learning and
decision making, resolve conflicts, and build social
trust. The formation of collaborative platforms can
be depicted as a process of institutionalization. If
structures and rules become rigid too quickly, the
formation of social capital is impeded. However, in
the absence of institutionalization, collaborative
platforms are not sustainable because they are very
vulnerable to changes in membership or leadership.
One may argue that resilient networks should
develop social capital among stakeholders while
creating a modest level of institutionalization.
A salient benefit of collaborative platforms that can
be characterized as communities of practice is their
ability to bridge established boundaries in a
dynamic and responsive way when implementing
and sustaining integrated water management in
general and the European Water Framework
Directive (WFD) in particular. The HarmoniCOP
project found that there was a need for bridging
organizations capable of linking networks of action
and translating the complexity of the changes
occurring at the macro level as a result of the
implementation of the WFD with the local
communities and stakeholders acting at the micro
level. In those governments, such as Germany's, that
were able to anticipate the changes at the macro
level and develop appropriate bridging organizations,
the transposition of the WFD and the social learning
processes associated with it was then carried out
more easily. The implementation of integrated
water management is not possible without the
increased collaboration of authorities and
stakeholder groups from different sectors, e.g.,
spatial planning, flood protection, water supply
management, that are not accustomed to interacting
with each other in the fragmented institutional
landscape characteristic of most water management
regimes (Mostert et al. 2006). The choice of a
biophysical reference such as the river basin to
determine the spatial scale leads to spatial misfits
between biophysical and administrative boundaries.
By bridging boundaries among authorities
operating at different scales, constituencies, expert
groups, and communities of practice may indeed
increase collective capabilities and social trust. The
institutional context of largely informal networks
maintains the flexibility needed to respond to
emerging challenges. Formal institutions are often
too rigid and inflexible to be able to respond.
An explicit role of the collaborative platforms
embedded in formal regulatory structures is to make
the dynamic relationship between formal and
informal institutions more transparent and
functional. These platforms provide a social context
for exploring and changing the relationship and for
resolving possible conflicts among the social norms
and rules enacted in practice, the values and interests
of different groups, and the formal rules prescribed
by legal frameworks. Powerful groups always find
a way to make sure that their interests are heard.
Collaborative platforms should guarantee open
access to participation and information. An obvious
consequence of the establishment of such platforms
is a change in power relationships. The overall
process is strongly determined by the political
culture characterizing water governance, which is
strongly influenced by the political system and
culture in which it is embedded.
The water governance regime may change when
new kinds of networks emerge and the stakeholders
participating in them gain new experiences and
share them with their constituencies. This suggests
that institutional change derives mainly from
alternative practice rather than from deliberate
consideration and choice between alternative
governance structures and the implementation of
new formal rules (see also Lindner 2003 for a similar
argument). It is highly unlikely that water
governance will change in isolation from the formal
institutional rules and cultural norms that
characterize the prevalent political and societal
environment. A range of national analyses
performed in the countries of the HarmoniCOP case
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studies has provided evidence for the strong
influence of national cultures, e.g., degree of
centralization or individualism, on conditions for
participatory and social learning processes (see
Patel and Stel 2004). Hence, even more long-term
developments may result in structural changes in a
recursive and iterative process between the second
and third levels depicted in Fig. 2. Changes at the
level of the social system as a whole may trigger
and/or support change in water governance, which
then may support the stabilization of innovation at
the societal level. The increase in the awareness of
complexity and of the need to develop dynamic and
innovative management approaches is, for example,
a widespread phenomenon in business and politics,
and water management is rather slow to address this
issue (Pahl-Wostl 2007a).
CONCLUSIONS
This paper argues that processes of social learning
and the presence of informal actor platforms are of
major importance when it comes to implementing
and supporting integrated and socially, environmentally,
and economically sustainable resource management
regimes over extended periods of time. However, it
is of crucial importance to better understand the role
of bridging organizations and the interplay between
formal and informal institutions.
We would like to highlight here three important
implications for water governance and water
management:
 
1. The principle of integrated water resources
management has been criticized for being
unrealistic. For example, Biswas (2004) and
several of those who responded to his article
pointed out a number of barriers to
implementation. The integration of sectors
and issues would require more centralized
policy development and implementation and
thus larger, slower, and more bureaucratic
authorities to handle all policy aspects.
Furthermore, objectives such as stakeholder
participation and decentralization would be
unlikely to promote integration. However,
this paper portrays another perspective, i.e.,
that of a more dynamic actor landscape in
which integration is not achieved by
bureaucratic hierarchies but rather by
processes of network governance. It also
highlights the need and the requirements for
processes of social learning to build the
capacity to achieve joint solutions and to
make thus stakeholder participation effective
in terms of achieving the goals of water
management.
2. Water management is facing increasing
uncertainties because of climate change, fast-
changing socioeconomic boundary conditions,
and the goal of integration over a wider range
of objectives. As a consequence, effective
water governance must be adaptive. This
paper highlights structural elements and
processes in water governance regimes that
make them more adaptive without compromising
their stability.
3. In most countries, the structural conditions
for integrated and adaptive water management
have not yet been determined. Consequently,
there is a need for major changes in which the
kinds of processes highlighted in this paper
will most likely play a major role.
 Challenges still lie ahead, in particular, in collecting
additional empirical evidence and in using available
empirical studies for comparative analyses. Our
analysis suggests that the development of such
adaptive institutional settings involves continued
processes of social learning in which stakeholders
at different scales are connected in flexible networks
and sufficient social capital and trust is developed
to collaborate in a wide range of formal and informal
relationships ranging from formal legal structures
and contracts to informal voluntary agreements. The
multiscale nature of institutional change is a quite
fascinating and highly relevant area of research of
which this paper could tackle only a few aspects.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art5/responses/
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APPENDIX 1. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE
 
Wenger (1998) introduced the idea of “communities of practice” (CoPs) as an analytical concept
intended to help elucidate the links between knowledge, learning, and communities within
organizations. CoPs are groups of people who interact and perform common tasks, e.g., an
interorganizational working group. CoPs are created by the members participating in them, who develop
a shared repertoire of resources. Wenger conceives of learning as social participation or “the social
experience of living in the world in terms of membership in social communities and active involvement
in social enterprises” (Wenger 1998:55-56). Participation can take different forms: “conflictual as well
as harmonious, intimate as well as political, competitive as well as cooperative” (Wenger 1998:55-56).
Participation alone remains too open without the other constituent process that transfers the negotiation
of meaning into something tangible: reification or giving concrete form to something abstract. Wenger
uses this concept to refer to “the process of giving form to our experience by producing objects that
congeal this experience into ‘thingness’” (Wenger 1998:58-59), through making, designing, or
representing things. Wenger points out that, although participation and reification are analytically
separable, in reality they are a single duality, and one cannot replace the other. Participation is
indeterminate without reification, and reifications become meaningless without participation. In terms of
the social learning concept developed in the HarmoniCOP project, social involvement and content
management can be distinguished analytically but do not exist independently in a real social system.
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APPENDIX 2. KEY PROCESSES IN SOCIAL LEARNING
Interaction ground rules
Ground rules refer to the norms and criteria that the members of a multiactor group use to deal with each
other and with the issues. Setting jointly developed ground rules at the onset can help to overcome
feelings of uncertainty about how to proceed in the multiactor environment (Vansina and Taillieu 1997).
Ground rules also refer to the formal and informal regulations and work forms that organize a concrete
interaction between the actors of a group with regard to aspects such as:
 
l
 who to invite and how to invite them;
 
l
 how to set the agenda;
 
l
 who should deal with specific issues individually, bilaterally, or multilaterally;
 
l
 how to treat information, e.g., as confidential, for internal or external use, as suitable for the
general public, etc.;
 
l
 how to deal with different points of view and interests; and
 
l
 how to make decisions, e.g., majority, unanimity, veto.
 
Minimal agreements on ground rules can enhance the active involvement of the total actor group. Early
agreements can facilitate the startup of activities, but ground rules can also evolve over time as the result
of a learning process. Actors with similar cultural, social, or organizational backgrounds may have a lot
of ground rules in common. These can be adopted implicitly by the multiactor group. However, when
actors with different backgrounds are involved, the ground rules will need to be stated and negotiated
explicitly.
Leadership and facilitation
The multiactor domain needs some form of direction setting to facilitate joint responsibility for
developing solutions. Because of the ambiguity of the issues in the problem domain, asymmetries
among the actors in power, resources, and/or expertise, and the complexity of the situation, participants
in multiactor contexts may experience a strong need for leadership that can take away the uncertainties
and ambiguities. However, classical leadership models are not suitable for multiactor settings, because
they assume the existence of a formal leader with managerial responsibility and clear and accepted
goals, whereas in multiactor settings no single organization has hierarchal control over all the others and
agreeing upon collaborative goals is an important challenge (Huxham and Vangen 2000b).
The literature on multiactor processes stresses the importance of shared or distributed leadership in
participative systems as an ideal (Brown and Hosking 1986, Gray 1989, Bryson and Crosby 1992,
Chrislip and Larson 1994, Feyerherm 1994, Yukl 1999, Gronn 2002). They stress that inducing shared
responsibility is a critical function of leadership. It is neither desirable nor likely that a single individual
take up all the leading roles. However, strong leadership may be important at certain points to “manage
the process leading to collaboration, particularly at points of pivotal breakdowns.” (McCaffrey et al.
1995:618). When this leadership focuses exclusively on the task, e.g., gathering information, working
out plans, managing the budget, etc., there is a risk that the results will be suboptimal, because in such
cases a strong leader may provoke high dependence in some actors and/or resistance from actors who
feel excluded or put at a disadvantage. In fact, strong process leadership may be critical for multiactor
collaboration (Chrislip and Larson 1994). Process leadership is about creating the conditions needed to
get the most out of the diversity of perspectives, competencies, and resources, while ensuring that each
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actor can meet his own objectives (Vansina 1999). Managing the inherent tensions in the relationships
among actors in interdependent work is an important aspect of process leadership. This kind of
leadership can be understood as “convening” the actors and keeping the collaboration going, rather than
steering and controlling the process unilaterally.
In some cases, especially when there is conflict, a third party such as a facilitator or mediator is invited
in to take up process leadership (Schuman 1996). Facilitators, either explicitly designated or implicitly
functioning as such, can fulfil an important role in dealing with the inherent tensions in multiactor
domains (L. Vansina, unpublished manuscript). However, facilitation should be used in a very cautious
and flexible way, and it certainly takes more than mechanically following some participatory recipes
(Leeuwis 2000). Those who take up facilitation roles need to be serious “reflective practitioners”
(Argyris and Schön 1974, Huxham 2000a), who can apply the toolbox of participatory methods (Jones
2001) from a good understanding of process.
Framing and reframing the issues in the problem domain
A problem domain such as the management of a river basin is not just out there in the natural world, it is
imbued with meanings by social actors who call for an intervention in a situation that they perceive as a
threat or an opportunity. Actors define or “frame” a domain as problematic and requiring intervention
through selectively identifying the main issues and delimiting its boundaries. They gradually “cut out” a
part of the ongoing reality, in interaction with the other social actors, and attribute a problematic
character to it. This we call the interactive framing of issues in the problem domain (Lewicki et al. 2003,
Dewulf et al. 2005).
Different social actors tend to acknowledge and highlight different aspects of reality as problematic,
because of their specific practices and experiences and the specific frames they tend to use for making
sense of them. When actors look at a situation from a different point of view, a situation ensues in which
different perspectives or frames are at play simultaneously (Salipante and Bouwen 1985, Bouwen et al.
1999). In addition to identifying the different frames used by the actors involved to make sense of the
problem domain, it is also important to look at how those frames develop, evolve, and influence each
other when actors interact in the course of a planning or management process. Although each actor
typically starts with a specific framing of the problem, this definition shifts through the interactive
process of shaping issues. Frames are co-constructed through the way actors make sense of their
situation in interaction with others (Putnam and Holmer 1992). The nature, importance, scope,
interrelatedness, breadth, and stability of problems are negotiated through the arguments and
counterarguments of the actors. Dealing with these differences in framing between actors is an
inevitable and crucial aspect of river basin management. When differences can be dealt with
constructively by addressing them and trying to connect them instead of avoiding or escalating them,
new possibilities can be discovered and social learning becomes possible.
Negotiation strategies
Both dialogic exchange and strategic behavior are likely to be present at the same time in multiactor
negotiations. Co-management of water resources then becomes a continuous process of dialogue and
negotiation in which actors defend their own interests and at the same time construct a broader and
common problem domain.
In the negotiation literature, a distinction is made between distributive and integrative negotiation
strategies (Fisher and Ury 1981, Bazerman 2000). This distinction is often explained by referring to the
pie metaphor: Distribution is about cutting an existing pie in smaller or bigger pieces, whereas
integration is trying to increase the size of the pie, to better serve the interests of all the actors.
Defending predefined positions on the issue can paralyze a negotiation, whereas exploring underlying
interests provides a better chance of finding innovative and mutually beneficial agreements.
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Direct interactions among representatives play an important role in transforming competitive, i.e.,
distributive or win/lose, relationships in collaborative, i.e., integrative or win/win, relationships among
the actors. These kinds of micro-social interactions among the representatives are a necessary although
not sufficient condition for social learning to develop. Representatives need to be capable of justifying
and feeding back their personal learning to their constituencies. Research evidence suggests that
representatives of diverse actors can construct a common vision through direct multilateral discussions.
However it seems harder to cope with the differences when it comes to planning concrete actions, and so
this part tends to be left to bilateral negotiations (Vansina and Taillieu 1997).
Representation and boundary management
Although multiactor processes involve organizations and social groups, much of the information
exchange, sense making, decision making, negotiation, and learning takes place among individual
representatives. Their mandate and their position in their own organization can differ widely, and so
does their degree of freedom to make decisions without consulting their constituency. Some
representatives may represent an underorganized actor group or an internally divided constituency,
which can lead to insecure or inconsistent behavior.
One of the major tasks of representatives is to manage the boundaries between their own organization
and the multiactor context, because the traditional boundaries of hierarchy, structure, role, and task are
often not available. Therefore, the actors have to manage and negotiate so-called “psychological”
boundaries on a continuous basis (Hirschhorn 1990). These include the boundaries of identity, task, and
authority. These boundaries are subject to changes and negotiation during the collaborative process. If
the boundaries around the multiactor group are firm enough, this enables the representatives to develop a
collective identity based on common interests (Vansina 1999). However, if identification with the
multiactor group is too strong, this might lead to conflicts of loyalty with one’s own constituency. This
may result in a dual conflict in which the representative who comes back from difficult negotiations with
the other actors faces an equally difficult negotiation with his or her constituency about the agreement
that was reached.
The so-called “dilemmas of the negotiator” refer to the growing tension that representatives may
experience at the boundary between the expectations of their constituencies and those of the multiactor
group. Representatives are supposed to identify with their constituencies and express their perspective
and interests. However, in the course of a collaborative process, they may gradually learn to appreciate a
situation from the perspectives of the other actors and to develop alternative problem definition and
solutions, so that they come to identify mroe with the multiactor group. The dilemma of transformation
refers to the fact that, the more the representative tries to transform the positions of his constituency, the
greater the chance to come to an agreement that is satisfactory for all actors involved. However, the
same efforts to transform these positions may pose a risk for the representative when the constituency
starts to question his or her legitimacy.
